Date: February 16, 2026
Target Area: North-East Atlantic Ocean (Portuguese Sector)
Subjects: ROSS Cargo (Sparta IV), FAP P-3C Orion (Reg: 14808), UAS Tekever AR5
Operational Dynamics and Deployed Assets
The current monitoring activity is configured as a multi-level Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) operation, aimed at the persistent tracking of a Russian naval unit classified as a "High Interest Vessel" (HIV).
Fixed-Wing Platform (MPA): The Portuguese Air Force Lockheed P-3C Orion (CUP+) is operating at an altitude of 7,075 ft. The primary mission involves long-range electronic and radar surveillance. The CUP+ upgrade enables the integration of acoustic sensors and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) optimized for the identification of surface targets in degraded weather conditions.
Unmanned Platform (UAS): The Tekever AR5 drone is operating in a LOIT (Loitering) pattern at low altitude (350 ft). This configuration allows for close-range Visual Identification (VID) and the collection of AIS/COMINT signals without deploying manned assets at risk of structural fatigue or direct interference
Navigation Analysis and Meteorological Constraints
The flight path and heading of the Sparta IV (121.6 x 22.6 meters) indicate an imminent logistical criticality. The vessel is maintaining a cruise speed of 11.4 knots on a heading of 290°.
Meteorological model analysis for February 18, 2026, in the Bay of Biscay indicates:
Atmospheric Pressure: Rapidly decreasing, favoring the development of a local depression.
Sea State: A significant increase in significant wave height exceeding 4 meters is forecasted.
Wind Vectors: Sustained gusts from the SW between 35 and 41 mph.
The Russian navigation strategy, previously observed in the Western Mediterranean between February 2 and 9, suggests a conservative Weather Routing approach, intended to avoid mechanical stress on the cargo or structural delays caused by limited sea-keeping in storm conditions.
GNSS Interference Phenomenology
Significant instability has been detected in the ADS-B data packets transmitted by the P-3C Orion.
Technically, this track distortion is attributable to localized GNSS Jamming or Spoofing phenomena.
| Phenomenon | Technical Description | Detected Impact |
| Signal Noise | Saturation of the L1/L2 frequency of the GPS receiver. | Fragmentation of the ADS-B track on the mapping interface. |
| Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) | Active emissions from the Sparta IV to degrade NATO sensor lock. | Requirement for Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) for aerial assets. |
| AIS Manipulation | Transmission of offset coordinates or "Ghost" signals to mislead monitoring systems. | Discrepancy between radar-confirmed position and transponder-declared position. |
The interaction between the Orion's sensors (radar and ESM suite) and potential Russian electronic countermeasures is creating a saturated electromagnetic environment. Despite the noise in the civilian signal, the persistence of the Tekever AR5 at very low altitude ensures the continuity of the tracking chain. The surveillance posture is expected to remain active until the vessel crosses the Brest parallel, where coordination will likely transition to French naval jurisdiction or other North Atlantic NATO assets.
sources:
https://www.flightradar24.com/
https://www.vesselfinder.com/
https://globe.adsbexchange.com/

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